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ABSTRACT: This paper presents the concept of relevance in argumentation theory analyzed from a pragma-
rhetorical angle. Special attention will be given to examples in which relevance is determined by the extended 
social context of the use of presentational devices in controversies. The analysis of examples will include the 
rhetorical concept of decorum, maintaining that a different emphasis should be given to the role of the speaker 
in the determination of relevance.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Probative, topical or dialectical relevance (Walton 2004); global, local, subject matter and 
probative relevance (Walton 2008); premise, topical or audience-contextual relevance 
(Tindale 1999); causal and epistemic relevance (Hitchcock 1992); relevance and its 
domain, object and aspects in a normative frame (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 
2004); all these distinctions, among many others, not only show the central importance of 
the concept ‘relevance’ and the serious intent of scholars in the field  to define the notion, 
but also the great range of areas which these intents come from, namely: informal logic, 
pragmatics, and rhetoric. There is no doubt that relevance is a key notion in contemporary 
argumentation theory.  
Running the risk of a hasty generalization, it could be said, that all these attempts 
follow and combine as much the normative sense and uses of relevance in natural 
language to evaluate arguments; Aristotle-Hamblin’s back and forth criticisms to measure 
relevance from logical and pragmatic views; Grice’s proposal of a maxim of relevance 
for a rational communicative exchange, as Sperber and Wilson’s notion of relevance, the 
human cognition and communication being, for these scholars, a relevance-oriented 
phenomenon. 
Even though the rhetorical angle has been explicitly taken by some scholars (e.g. 
Wenzel 1989; Tindale 1999, 2004), especially to understand how the relevance of a set of 
premises and conclusion should be evaluated in a broader sense, in fact, they have 
demonstrated already that the logical and pragmatic dimensions of relevance depend on a 
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rhetorical account, the role of the speaker and the hearer or audience are not totally 
explained in these approaches. The advice has been too vague to get a clear concept of 
relevance from a rhetorical point of view. For example, Wenzel sees it  
 
as a pragmatic relationship between the materials of argument and the situation, that is, to the 
complex of persons, events, objects, relations, exigencies, and constraints that an arguer seeks to 
encompass (1989, p. 89).  
 
In what follows, an effort will be made to explain how the concept of decorum, in 
a Ciceronian way, could help in modeling a revised concept of relevance for 
argumentation theory. My hypothesis is that we could adopt the term “Second order 
relevance” to evaluate arguments in contexts of controversies in which we know that the 
speakers have a great access to and the skill to manoeuvre information and a clear 
position in a specific field, namely: political, academic, artistic, and scientific. Note that 
within each field different other fields can be distinguished: for example, in the political 
field, parliamentarian debate, political parties discourse, governmental communications, 
and so on. In each field what at first sight could appear as irrelevant, in a second 
movement in the dialogue could show the relevance of a comment or claim.  
I will adopt the ideas contained in the notion of decorum and use the phrase 
“second order relevance” in the following situation: when the hearer asks the speaker for 
clarification because the hearer assumes that the other party is trying to say something 
else, or when the hearer cannot assume that the speaker is irrelevant due to his history. 
An example will be given to illustrate my point, especially those that are reflected by the 
uses of presentational devices, namely: metaphors, figurative language, analogies, etc. 
 
2. DECORUM 
 
2.1. Decorum and Grice’s account of relevance 
 
Aptum, prosekon, acommodatum, decens, propium were the words used to refer to 
“decorum,” this is, the appropriated, adequate, and pertinent participation of a speaker 
according to contexts, participants, and expectations. The idea of decorum could be 
defined as the quality maximenecessaria for the speaker to suit her speech as well as her 
capacities to the expectation of the audience and the circumstances.1 Defined in this way, 
decorum is a very similar concept to relevance in Grice’s sense.  
With Be relevant, the third maxim under the cooperative principle,2 Grice 
emphasized that the speaker should contribute appropriately to the immediate needs at 
each stage of the transaction (Grice 1989, p. 28). Although according to Huang (2007, p. 
27), Grice had in mind that the cooperative principle and its associated maxims are 
normally adhered to by both the speaker and the addressee in a conversational interaction, 
                                                            
1 In Cicero the most clear indications of the concept are found in Orator (II 17, III 201-211); in Quintilian 
in Institutio Oratoria (11, 1, 1; 11, 1, 16-28)—see version LOEB Classical Library The Orator’s 
Education. Books 11-12.  
2 Grice (1989, p. 26) points out about this principle: “Make your conversational contribution such as is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which 
you are engaged,” which is already a way to define “relevance” in natural language.  
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it is not very clear if Grice meant the hearer. It is more evident that the advice was Be 
relevant speaker! than Be relevant hearer! 
What I think is incorrect in this view is that by making the relevance the 
responsibility of the speaker the problem of relevance, as a property in argumentation, is 
not described properly. It is also a matter of the hearer to act and contribute in an 
appropriate way to maintain the relevance of a speech act in a collective activity as, by 
definition, argumentation is.3 Here, I think, the idea of decorum could contribute. 
When Cicero and Quintilian talk about decorum, they do not only consider the 
things that the orator and/or the educator should do or have in order to please their 
audiences, but also the role that the audience and/or the hearer should have and the things 
that they should do in order to behave decorously, namely: remember the history of the 
speaker and keep the evaluation of the arguments used by the speaker in balance with his 
history.4 Following Cicero's idea, that the “convenient” depends as much on the speaker 
as on the audience, the ethical dimension necessarily has to be part of the explanation.  
What is interesting here is that this ethical dimension in Cicero is related to a 
mental aspect as well. This could be seen as, apart from the obvious and many 
differences, especially the genetic and semiotic dimensions, a peculiar coincidence with 
Sperber and Wilson’s account of the principle of relevance –or even as a step ahead of  
Cicero’s intuition in this area. Cicero claimed that a genuine decorous conduct is that 
which is expressed in a virtuous manner, this is, a manner which is already a component 
of thought of the speaker or hearer. This virtuous manner, therefore, should be manifested 
always as a healthy reciprocity between the participants in a dialogue –specially, we 
could add, in the controversial ones. In De Officiis (I, pp. 93-95), Cicero points out 
explicitly that respecting the others is the best way to be relevant, decorous; the speaker 
by means of doing the thing that has to be done and not being guided only by the 
searching of effectiveness, and the audience by paying careful attention to the reasoning 
of the other party. Later an example will clarify this point. 
 
2.2. Decorum, Sperber and Wilson’s perspective, and argumentation theory 
 
Apart from a vague effort by Tindale (1999, pp. 101-109) to broach some ideas contained 
in the account of Sperber and Wilson of the principle of relevance, especially the concept 
of “cognitive environment,” to explain his particular notion of audience-contextual 
relevance –to say finally that if a premise or argument has contextual effects, then it is 
relevance-, it seems that explicitly the cognitive, semiotic and communicative points of 
view of Sperber and Wilson on relevance have not been assumed in argumentation 
theory. In fact, Woods (1992), points out that this theory fails in explaining relevance 
because basically its approach is a propositional one, and van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
(1992, 2004) are uncomfortable with this approach, not only because it reduces Grice’s 
four  maxims to one, namely, relevance, but especially because it does not give a proper 
                                                            
3 I am aware of the similarity of this idea with the notion of principle of charity (Davidson, 2001) which 
says that the hearer should act on and interpret a message trying to make maximum sense of the words and 
thoughts of others.  
4 It should be added that Aristotle talked about a “decorous performance” in Ethics Nicomachean (1098a), 
in Poetics (1454a), and in Rhetoric (1404-1405a), when he advises the poets how to keep the appearance in 
the comedy and tragic art. 
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account to evaluate arguments in a normative way; Walton (2004, pp. 131-132) explicitly 
points out that the concept of relevance in Sperber and Wilson “fits somewhere into a 
context of dialogue where information-seeking of some kind is the goal” (2004, p. 132), 
given that, in Walton’s reading of it, they define relevance in terms of the collection of 
information.5 
 But in Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008), there is an interesting case in which 
Walton’s (2004) claim seems to be challenged. Talking about the premises that are left 
implicit in certain argument schemes, they recognize that in the argument from position 
to know there is a “natural” use of the assumption of relevance. They point out (2008, p. 
17): 
 
In many cases there is a range of assumptions, all of which can be seen as acting as implicit linked 
premises. For example, recall the scheme capturing argument from position to know introduced 
earlier: 
 
(P1) a is in a position to know whether A is true (false) 
(P2) a asserts that A is true (false) 
(C) Therefore, A is true (false) 
(CQ1) Is a in a position to know whether A is true (false)? 
(CQ2) Is a an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source? 
(CQ3) Did a assert that A is true (false)? 
 
In a canonical use of this scheme, the second premise, P2, is asserted explicitly, as is the 
conclusion. Premise P1 is left implicit (and, as Walton points out, is probably assumed by the 
hearer by Grice’s Principle of Charity, by which an assumption of honesty and relevance is made). 
The argument thus has its conclusion C, supported by the two linked premises P1 and P2 (if either 
premise fails, then the argument falls down, just as with the minor and major premises of a modus 
ponens).  
 
 Apart from the confusion of attributing the Principle of Charity to Grice, what is 
shown in this case is: that usually relevance acts in the mental space of both speaker and 
hearer as an implicit process; that relevance is a structural part of the activity of 
argumentation, manifested in arguments schemes, among other mechanisms; that 
relevance, as Sperber and Wilson claimed, comes with a presumption of relevance in 
terms content and form; that premise-content-relevance works as a sort of warrant 
(Freeman 1992); and that relevance has a rhetorical force in terms of effect in the 
argument and in the hearer, which becomes clear when the hearer does not ask any 
critical questions.6 
                                                            
5 It should be noted that between the argumentation theory scholars the first edition of Relevance is quoted, 
and not the second edition (1995), in which Sperber and Wilson added, apart from new footnotes, a 
postface in which many critical remarks were directly addressed by the authors, such as those related to the 
different concept of relevance that could be found in the first edition, and the idea of presumption of 
relevance, among others. 
6 This quote also shows that relevance has a dialectical dimension. Walton (1997, 2004) calls it the 
“dialectical nature of relevance,” because “Relevance of an argument is determined at the local level by the 
sequence of questions and replies (the profile of dialogue), in relation to how the sequence matches the 
proper normative profile determined by the argumentation scheme and the appropriate critical questions. 
But relevance is determined at the global level by the type of dialogue the argument is supposed to be part 
of, and its contribution, at a given stage of this dialogue (1997, p. 169). 
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 The last characteristic emphasized, the rhetorical force of relevance, is in fact the 
step by which Sperber and Wilson discuss the reliability of the presumption of relevance, 
the “rhetorical disposition” of the speaker to achieve relevance, and the working of 
ostensive-inferential communication. These aspects are all crucial, to me, to relate the 
idea of decorum with argumentation. 
 Sperber and Wilson say:  
 
How reliable is the presumption of relevance? As we all know, the world is full of bores. The 
principle of relevance does not say that communicators necessarily produce optimally relevant 
stimuli; it says that they necessarily intendthe addressee to believe that they do. Even bores 
manifestly intend their audience to believe that they are worth listening to. The presumption of 
relevance communicated by an utterance does not have to be accepted as true. The communicator 
might fail to achieve relevance; the addressee might doubt the communicator’s ability to succeed 
in being relevant. However, from the presumption of relevance there follows a more reliable 
presumption that relevance has been attempted, if not achieved. A communicator who fails to 
make it manifest to her audience that she is being optimally relevant may nevertheless succeed in 
making it manifest that she is trying to be optimally relevant. (1995, p. 159; emphases added) 
 
 If this style of writing in a rhetorical fashion (emphasized by my cursives) goes 
fast and well, and Sperber and Wilson consider it true, to describe the communicative 
behavior of the communicator or speaker in noncontroversial contexts, as all the 
examples of Sperber and Wilson are, why should it not be true in more complex 
scenarios, like the argumentative ones, where intent, effects, audience, and a long 
etcetera, are more necessary. In other words, because relevance is also a matter of 
maneuvering and degree, we should try to expand the theory around the speaker to the 
hearer, to formulate something like the Listening act theory, this is, to fix the rational 
parameters, or the rules of the game or profile, of the “correct” hearer’s relevant behavior. 
And, as I believe, with the idea of decorum we have accomplished part of the job. 
 With Sperber and Wilson (1995), we know that we always, by nature, maximize 
relevance, selecting and creating the most adequate context to interpret an act of 
communication, in order to understand, by means of reasoning protocols, what is implied 
by others. Thus, to have more knowledge of the agent of the speaker and the context 
means to have more criteria in selecting and creating the proper reasoning protocol. 
When a hearer does not know the speaker, or does not have the right information on the 
context to understand a speech act, she should ask for clarification as a move to search for 
second order relevance.     
 Because in natural language relevance is always a matter of evaluation, a 
normative act, the uses of second order relevance (asking for clarification, recognizing 
non-attention, misinterpretation, and so on) could help to accept, to a certain degree, the 
lack of local relevance, knowing that, for example, the speaker has a public history of 
“delayed” relevance. If we know that the speaker and the hearer can strategically 
maneuver relevance, the former hiding it, the latter not recognizing it, it could be of help 
to design the condition of preparation and satisfaction of the hearer, just to keep the 
protagonistin balance, at least theoretically.  
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3. RELEVANCE AND PRESENTATIONAL DEVICES 
 
In this section, the ideas until now discussed will be seen in the light of the analysis of 
several cases. As Krabbe (1992, p. 272) noted, we should be restrict ourselves to those 
cases which are really argumentative, part of persuasive dialogue. The first example is 
taken from Krabbe’s (1992, pp. 279-280) discussion about relevance criticism in natural 
language: 
 
(1) Wilma: The Soviet Union is a socialist nation. 
(2) Bruce: How come? 
(3) Wilma: Well, it calls itself a socialist nation. 
(4.3) Bruce: You can’t give that as a reason. 
(5.3) Wilma: Why not? 
(6.1) Bruce: The Soviet Union’s calling itself a socialist nation has nothing to do with whether it is 
one or not. 
(7) Wilma: Why wouldn’t that be a piece of evidence? 
(8) Bruce: The only pattern your reasoning could follow is: X calls itself a Y, therefore is a Y. But 
this has no force whatsoever. 
(9.1) Wilma: My remarks are not of that type at all. Allow me to return to the point at issue. 
(4.2) Bruce: O.K. So what is your point? 
(5.2) Wilma: I think the Soviet authorities are more or less in a position to stipulate what it means 
to be a socialist nation. Not that this term was ever very clearly defined… 
 
 As a first comment, Krabbe points out that Wilma and Bruce enter a metadialogue 
(at 4.3) to discuss an argument scheme at stage (8) and (9.1), but they return to the 
dialogue afterwards. The metadialogue occurred because of Bruce’s evaluation of the 
relevance of Wilma’s turn 3. For my purposes here, (4.3) and (9.1) show what I call 
“second order relevance” by means of a reciprocal effort to clarify what seems irrelevant 
at first. The effort of clarifying shows, at the same time, an underlying decorous behavior 
of the participants, because they try to “save the face” of the other by rescuing the 
relevant intention, content and explanation of the topic at issue.  
 A different but common case, which comes from a real political context, is the 
following. In 2005, the two female presidential candidates discussed how to deal with the 
military budget. Michelle Bachelet, the current Chilean president, said what is recaptured 
in the following news extract:  
 
Bachelet: Alvear’s project is like “selling mister Otto’s couch.” 
 
While the presidential candidate of the Christian Democrats defended her proposal to eliminate the 
special copper law, the progressive candidate pointed out that this proposal was like “selling Don 
Otto’s couch.” “Believing that the Special Copper law is the problem is like selling Don Otto’s 
couch, do you know that joke?” With these words the presidential candidate Michelle Bachelet 
answered her opponent’s project to eliminate the Special Copper Law that gives a fixed budget to 
the Armed Forces, and instead to give that money to help the poorest. According to Bachelet 
“Don’t let us fool ourselves because the Armed Forces have international bills to pay for many 
years to come” specifying that, for example, “the important discussion of 2006, given the 
relationship we have with our neighbors and the peace that we wish for, is about what we need for 
our social development and how much we need for our military defense.” 
 
 Bachelet pointed out that Alvear’s proposal was completely irrelevant for the long 
term social and military politics in Chile. The interesting thing here is that, at the same 
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time, Bachelet used a very strong rhetorical presentational device: humour. As the 
speaker says, the expression ‘to sell the couch of Mister Otto’ originally comes from a 
joke: “When mister Otto realizes that his wife has been cheating on him with his best 
friend, Fritz, on the couch in his own house, Otto decides, just because it is such an 
offence, to sell the couch.” Clearly, the joke manifests two categories: the category 
‘idiocy’ (the character as well as the situation is ‘stupid’), and the category ‘ignorance of 
the real problem’ or ‘ignorance of the right solution.’ The correlation is: the ‘stupid’ 
character doesn’t see the real problem and doesn’t know the right solution. 
In this context, the presentational device, by means of an idiomatic expression, 
was used in a very specific discussion in the general debate between the two female 
presidential candidates during their campaign in 2005. The strategic uses of the 
expression are also related to the meta-discursive comment of the speaker in: Do you 
know that joke?, which is a rhetorical question that doubly emphasizes the meaning of the 
idiom. This comment of the speaker also emphasizes that the expression satisfies the 
audience’s demands: to explain difficult issues within very clear frames, associations and 
images. On the contrary, if today’s President would have had to explain the expression 
because of an unexpected negative answer to the question from the journalist (something 
like: “No, I don’t know the joke!!”), then the strategic uses of the expression would have 
lost strength (the worst thing being to explain a joke), and more importantly, she would 
have been accused of presenting an irrelevant joke for the topic at hand. Furthermore, by 
explaining the joke the character of Mister Otto would have gotten more importance, and 
have been associated more explicitly with Soledad Alvear, and then the uses of the 
idiomatic expression would have been a personal attack, an ad hominem fallacy in its 
abusive version, this is, doubly irrelevant. Because the speaker in her argument 
emphasizes the confusion in the solution of the problem by means of a sharp 
argumentative strategy, the strategic manoeuvring is sound and not fallacious. Because 
the speaker focuses on the opponent’s reasoning and points out the inconsistency between 
her proposal and the implicit accepted standpoint (that the budget of the army cannot 
change just like that), Alvear’s reasoning is exposed as ridiculous, like the behaviour of 
don Otto. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2000, p. 206) claim:  
 
A statement is ridiculous as soon as it conflicts, without justification, with an accepted opinion... 
An error of fact, says La Bruyère, is enough to make a wise man ridiculous […] Ridiculous works 
toward the preservation of what is accepted. 
 
What I think is shown in this case is that relevance is not only a matter of context 
(Tindale 1999), but also a matter of the regular ways of problem-resolving in politics, 
what the audience expects in terms of relevant political behaviour: sharpness, intelligence 
and strategies.  
 A different case, but also very common in political contexts, is the following: 
 
The Communist Party happily received the invitation from the Renovación Nacional to discuss the 
binominal electoral system 
  
Without assuring that he would be part of the meeting, the president of the Communist Party, 
Guillermo Teillier, said that he would not be an obstacle in trying to reach an agreement, after 
Carlos Larraín had said “one must also dance with the ugly girl.” “We are not going to be an 
obstacle at all: we are going to take a seat and make proposals of course, and we also want to listen 
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to the proposals of the Renovación Nacional,” he indicated. The leader of the Communist Party 
said: “if the government has no problems, then we will have even fewer problems,” and added that 
they were going to make a proposal very soon. The invitation was explained in very curious terms 
by the president of the RN, Carlos Larraín, who said that “we can invite whoever we want.” 
According to Larraín “I try to be a gentleman and remember what my mother taught me: we must 
also dance with the ugly girl; it was not only a matter of dancing with the prettiest of the team.” 
“For that reason, we think that we have to talk with the Communist Party, who don’t have lepra 
either.” 
 
The use of the idiomatic expression, as a presentational device, is fallacious in this 
context. In fact, it is doubly fallacious: on the one hand, because the expression “one 
must also dance with the ugly girl” falls into the category of ‘voluntary sacrifice’ or 
‘action against basic desires’ based on a sort of moral backing, and the invitation to the 
CP is not made through reasons or arguments, but by references to the ‘good’ properties 
or qualities of the speaker (RN). The fallacy here is known as Argumentum ad 
verecundiam in its ethical version. On the other hand, the projection or understanding of 
the CP as the ‘ugly person’ is a qualification that gives a negative feature, the ugliness, 
without any justification: Ad hominem fallacy. Nevertheless, because the expression 
works in a negotiation and, moreover, because it is supported by explanations like “I try 
to be a gentleman and remember what my mother taught me” and “we think that we have 
to talk with the Communist Party, who don’t have leper either,” the fallacious movement 
is hidden behind a strategy of “good manners.” 
I would like to apply the Toulminian model to represent the way in which the 
president of the RN uses the relevant implicit warrant (Freeman 1992) to link the 
premises and conclusion (note that the analogy contained in “one must also dance with 
the ugly girl,” that replaces ‘the Communist Party must also be invited to the discussion,’ 
is put in italics, and between brackets the literal information that the expression 
represents): 
 
Fig. 1. Argumentative Scheme (By analogy) 
            
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: So, we have to dance with 
the ugly girl (so, the RN should invite the 
Communist Party to the negotiations)  
Implicit Data:  
(The Communist Party is present at the party and 
is excluded; CP is the ugly girl; but she isn’t that 
ugly, she doesn’t suffer from leper) 
 Rebuttal Condition: Unless 
the ugly girl doesn’t want to 
dance (Unless the 
Communist Party declines 
the invitation) 
 
 
 
 
  
Warrant: One should dance with all the invitees including the 
ugly one sat any party (one must negotiate with all the parties 
including the enemy in political negotiations)  
 
 Backing: the old presumption of very good manners which teaches that one has to sacrifice 
in order to get future benefits encourages to… (the supposition from the political practice 
that it is a good strategy to negotiate with the enemy in order to win further advantages 
which encourages to…)  
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The rebuttal condition, which is not explicit in the discourse, has been inserted 
because it gives important interpretative elements. The rebuttal condition is part of the 
analogical consistency line and part of the basic scene: any invitation could be refused, 
even by the ugly girls. Nevertheless, because this possibility is very improbable 
(otherwise the expression itself would not exist), the warrant and the backing get a special 
argumentative strength. This special strength is related to this type of argumentative 
scheme: comparison argumentative scheme; and in particular by analogy: something that 
in literal terms is controversial (to invite the Communist Party to negotiate with the right-
wing party), is explained by a non-controversial comparison (to invite the ugly girl to 
dance). In this context, the principle of justice, which is the base of the comparison 
scheme, was applied fallaciously. The principle of justice says that people or situations 
that are in similar conditions have to be treated alike. Thus, just as one has to ask the ugly 
girls to dance at a party so that they don’t feel excluded or abandoned, one must also 
invite the Communist Party so that they don’t feel excluded or abandoned. The rebuttal 
condition does not appear in the discourse because of the strong popular belief that there 
is a gentlemanly necessity to dance with every girl, and for this reason, it is very 
improbable that an ugly woman at a party will refuse the invitation to dance. So, the 
supposed sacrifice is made with a certain social-moral security. 
The central point to our analysis here is that the Communist Party assumes its role 
of the ugly girl. They did not care about the fallacies (as the leader said that “he would 
not be an obstacle in trying to reach an agreement”). The complete analogy was accepted, 
with its presumptions and assumptions, by the Communist Party: given that they accepted 
being the ugly girl at the party (literal information: given that they are running the risk of 
being excluded from the political system), then she has to accept the invitation to dance 
(to participate politically they have to negotiate). The first order and local dialogue 
irrelevant way of reasoning of the right-wing party was ignored by the Communist Party 
because, knowing the political situation in Chile, they privilege the deepest problematic 
political issue. I will call this “historical content relevance,” which also could be seen as a 
second order relevance movement.  
In terms of decorum, the CP accepted the fallacious reasoning because for them 
what was the focus was to go back to a formal and normal political system: to dismiss the 
chance of doing so could be seen as a huge mistake and, in that way, an indecorous 
political action of the leaders against the historical expectations of the communist people.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Relevance, then, is not only a matter of the dialogue’s structure, topical and audience-
oriented coordination, but also a matter of historical expectative.  
 What has been shown by the examples analyzed is that second order relevance 
works in one to one decorous dialogical behaviour in which the participants ask for a 
clarification when the relevance of a premise is not immediately given (case 1); second 
order relevance also works when there is a standard or ritualized way of decorous action 
in certain argumentative spaces (case 2); and finally, second order relevance works when 
one chooses historical relevance over a fallacious move performed by one of the 
participants.  
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 Perhaps it is counterintuitive to say that we need a Listening Act theory in order to 
design a model of relevance in argumentation theory, but it is not that far from what the 
reality is showing in terms of evaluative argumentative behaviour. On the other hand, 
advices of “relevant performances” to the speakers are so old as the history of 
philosophy. According to Erasmus of Rotterdam, it was Thales of Miletus who said “Talk 
little and well,” which not only means that the wise man should talk only when it is 
necessary, with an exact amount of words related to the context and the situation, but also 
considering the other party and evaluating the long term benefits.  
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